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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
11176

\
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff-appellant
to recover from the defendant-respondent amounts
of money spent by the appellant in settling a personal injury action brought against Olsen Chevrolet, Inc., which was the insured under a liability
policy issued by the respondent and also by the appellant. The respondent has relied below and on appeal upon its automobile business exclusion to exclude any liability for said accident and resulting
injuries. Appellant and Respondent have both submitted briefs on that question. No further statement
of facts will be attempted inasmuch as it would
merely be repetitive of appellant's main brief.
1
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The purpose of appellant's reply brief is to re.
spond to respondent's Statement of Facts and fo
Point Three of respondent's brief.
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant wishes to clarify the record in re.
gards to respondent's statement of fact that the
"'other insurance" provision in its policy is excess
over any other collectible insurance. The portion of
respondent's policy quoted in its Statement of Facts
does not portray fully the ''other insurance" clause
contained in said policy. Exhibit Dl herein provides
the full "other insurance" provisi'on which states:

"Allstate shall not be liable under this
Part 1 for a greater proportion of any loss
than the applicable limit of liability stated on,
the Supplement Page bears to the total appli· ·
cable limit of liability of all collectible insur·
ance against such loss; provided, however, the
insurance with respect to a temporary sub·
stitute automobile or a non-owned automobile
shall be excess insurance over any other col·
lectible insurance."
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT THREE
Respondent indicates in Point Three of its brief
that should the court rule that the automobile exclu·
sion does not apply, that the court then should hold
that the appellant's coverage is primary and the
respondent's was secondary. This conclusion is er· i
roneous inasmuch as respondent's po 1 icy in the
"other insurance" clause provides for a pro-rata dis· i
2
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1

tribution of coverage except in respect to temporary substitute or non-owned automobiles, where it
is excess. The respondent wishes to place itself in the
position of covering a temporary substitute or nonowned automobile; however, such is impossible under the facts of this case. Here the automobile involved in the collision was the named automobile
under the respondent's policy, and thus the respondent can hardly claim that it was a non-owned or
temporary substitute automobile. The respondent
must provide coverage from the standpoint of the
automobile and its owner and not from the standpoint of the driver.
On the other hand, the "other insurance" clause
contained in the appellant's policy provides as follows:
"If the i n s u r e d has other insurance
against a loss covered by this policy, the company shall not be liable under this policy for
a greater proportion such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declaration bears to the total applicable limit of
liability of all valid and collectible insurance
against such loss; provided, however, the insurance under this policy with respect 'to loss
arising out of ~he !llaintenance or use of a_ny
hired automobile msured on a cost of hire
basis or the use of any non-owned automobile
shall be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance."

Here the non-owned automobile excess provision
correctly applies for the coverage is determined
3
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from the driver's standpoint and not from the
standpoint of the automobile. In other words, as
to the driver and his insurer, it was a use of
non-owned automobile; however, as to the auto.
mobile and its insurer, the use was not of a non.
owned automobile but rather was the use of the
described automobile under that policy. Thus, the
coverage situation is as follows: the respondent's
policy provides a pro-rata coverage, and the appellant's policy provides an excess coverage.
Where pro-rata and excess clauses conflict, the
courts have uniformly held 'that the policy with the
pro-rata clause insuring the automobile is primary,
and the excess clause covering the non-owner driver
is excess. The general rule is stated in 76 ALR 2nd
505 where the court first of all noted that courts
have used varying rationale for arriving at their
conclusions and then proceeded to conclude:
"Despite the foregoing, the cases seem
susceptible of a certain amount of generaliza·
tion. Thus, if the non-ownership coverage of·
f ered by one of the policies involved is of the
'excess insurance' type, the conclusion is gen·
erally reached - no matter how various the
reasoning adopted in support of it a~d t~e
di'fferent cases may be -· 'that the pohcy is·
sued to the owner of the vehicle is the 'primary' policy, and the company issuing it is
liable up to the limits of the po!icy with~ut
apportionment, although the policy C?l!tai~s
a pro-rata clause. ·To sta:te the proposition in
another way: if one policy has been issued
to the owner of the vehicle causing damage,
4
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and another covers the same loss by virtue
of the relationship to the accident of one who
is not the vehicle owner, the latter's insurer
at least where its coverage is of the 'exces~
insurance' variety, is in the favorable position
and need not assume any 'of the loss, although
the vehicle owner's policy contains a pro-rata
clause ... "
The annotation then proceeds to discuss the
following cases which support the proposition that
the owner's policy with the pro-rata provision provides the primary coverage: American Surety Company vs. Canal Insurance Company, 258 F. 2nd 934
(1958, CA 4 S.C.); Maryland In Neighbours vs.
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company, 169 F.
Supp. 368 (1959, DC Md); Citizens Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 273 F. 2nd 189 (1959, CA6
Michigan); United Services Automobile Association
vs. Russom, 241 F. 2nd 296 (1957, CA5 Texas);
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company vs.
American Casualty Company, 135 Montana 475, 342
Pac. 2nd 748 (1959); American Motorists Insurance Company vs. Weir, 46 Atlantic 2nd 7, (Connecticut, 1946); Busch & Company vs. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 158 N.E. 2nd 351 (Massachusetts, 1959); Eicher vs. Universal Underwriters,
83 N.W. 2nd 895 (Minnesota, 1957); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation vs. Piazza, 152 N.E. 2nd 236 (New York, 1958); American Surety Company vs. A m e r i c an Indemnity
Company, 72 A. 2nd 798 (New Jersey, 1950); Con5
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tinental Casualty vs. American Fidelity & Casualty
Company, 275 F. 2nd 381 (Illinois, 1960); Turpin
vs. Standard Reliance Insurance Co11ipany, 99 N.W.
2nd 26 (Nebraska, 1959); American Auto Insur-1
ance Company vs. Republic Indemnity Company,
341 Pac. 2nd 675 (California, 1959); Pacific Indemnity Company vs. California State Automobile
Association, 12 Cal. Reporter 20; National Indemnity Company vs. Lead Supplies, Inc., 195 F. Supp.
249 (DC Minnesota) ; Lindon & Lancashire Insurance Company vs. Government Employees Insurance
Company, 168 A. 2nd 855, New Jersey; Motorists
Mutual Insurance Company vs. Lumbermans Mutiial Insurance Company, 205 N.E. 2nd 67, Ohio; and
Safeco Insurance Company vs. Pacific Indemnity
Company, 401 Pac. 2nd 205, Washington. The latter
case is typical of all of the cases cited. There the
owner of the vehicle was an automobile dealership
whose insurer issued a policy containing a pro-rata
clause, the driver of the vehicle was a prospective
purchaser whose insurance policy contained an excess insurance while driving a non-owned automobile. The court held that the dealer's policy was the
primary insurance.
Appellant has been able to find two Utah cases
which are in point. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Company vs. Farmers Insurance
Group, 14 Utah 2nd 89, 377 Pac. 2nd 786 (1963),
wherein the situation was just the reverse of the
present case. There the car was owned by an em6
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ployee of the automobile dealer, which had been
loaned to a customer while his vehicle was being repaired. Without stating what types of "other insurance" clauses were contained therein, the court
stated that the insurance on the owner was primary
and the insurance of the driver was excess. The
provisions as contained in the present policies being
standard, we would assume that the same provisions
were contained in the policies in that case.
The second case which is even more helpful is
the case of Russell vs. Paulson, 18 Utah 2nd 157,
417 Pac. 2nd 658 ( 1966) . There the court was concerned with the construction of the "other insurance" provisions in regards to uninsured motorist
coverage. The owner and driver of the insured vehicle had a policy which provided a pro-rata coverage where the insured was the named insured under
other similar insurance. The passenger in the car
who was injured had a policy of insurance which
provided that the coverage was excess where said
insured was injured while occupying a non-owned
automobile. The court stated on page 159 to 160:
"Where there is a conflict between a pro-rata and
an excess 'other insurance' clause, a majority of the
courts imposed primary liability on the pro-rata insurer and hold the excess insurer responsible only
for secondary coverage of the loss."
1

"The pro-rata clause is consid~red ~n
operative on the theory that the policy with
the excess provision is not the "other insurance" required for its application; the excess
7
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r
clause, on the other hand, is held to limit its
policy to only secondary coverage, leaving the
pro-rata insurer liable to the limits of its
policy."
The court then stated after reviewing the minority position set forth in the case of Lamb-Wes ton,
In(',., vs. Oregon Automobile Insurance Company,
346 Pac. 2nd 643 (Oregon, 1959):
"The reasoning of the Oregon court is
persuasive, but we are construing to adopt
the majority rule which imposes primary liability on the pro-rata insurer and secondary
liability on the excess insurer."
Thus, it is clear that the rule of Utah and that
of the overwhelming majority of the states is that
the insurer of the owner of the vehicle having a prorata "other insurance" clause provides the primary
coverage, and the non-owner driver's insurer with
an excess ''other insurance" clause is excess only.
With this established, it is obvious that where the
excess carrier undertakes the defense of the lawsuit
after the primary carrier denies coverage, that it is
entitled to recover from said primary carrier the
amount of money spent in the settlement and the expenses incurred therein. This point was specifically
decided in the previously cited case of National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Company vs. Far·
mers Insurance Group, supra, wherein this court
held that the excess or secondary insurer was enti tied to recover from the primary insurer the ex8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

penses and other costs involved in settling with the
injured plaintiff.
Appellant respectfully submits that the respondent has the primary responsibility for coverage in
this case and that it should therefore reimburse the
appellant the amounts expended in settling the claim.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
W. BRENT WILCOX, Esq.
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
By W. Brent Wilcox
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